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I. INTRODUCTION 
On April 17, 2015, John Hendricks was faced with a choice: fight or flight.1 Taking 
a break between fares while working as an Uber driver, he found himself in a life-or-death 
situation.2 He heard a man, later identified as Everardo Custodio, yell to a group of 
pedestrians.3 Hendricks then watched as Custodio produced a gun and began firing at the 
group.4 In imminent danger himself, Hendricks realized that his only means of potential 
???????????????????????????????????????????????5 Therefore, Hendricks, a concealed-carry 
permit holder, drew his handgun and shot Custodio.6 ????????????????????????????????????
Custodio was the only party ???????? ??? ???? ?????????? ????????????????????? ????????????
struck by a bullet Custodio fired.7 ????????????????????????????????????? ???? ???????????
Chicago provides a useful illustration of the polarizing issue of the public-carry of 
handguns in the United ???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
best course of action was the one he took?using his firearm to defend himself and other 
innocent bystanders. On the other hand, some would argue that Hendricks should have 
refrained because Custodio had not shot anyone and might have stopped firing before 
anyone was hit. Whether Hendricks is properly characterized as a hero, an ordinary citizen 
exercising his right to self-defense, or an outdated throwback clinging to his guns depends 
on whom ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
joined the vast majority of states and became a shall-issue regime, the outcome likely 
would have been different and the death toll higher. 
A shall-issue state is one in which public-carry permits are issued to all applicants 
so long as certain baseline requirements are satisfied.8 Usually, these requirements are 
minimal and are met when an applicant proves the absence of both criminal history and 
significant mental health concerns.9 On the other hand, a may-issue state is a regime that 
                                                          
1. See generally Geoff Ziezulewicz, Concealed Carry Shootings Now Part of Chicago’s Gun Reality, CHI.
TRIB. (Nov. 20, 2015, 12:12 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-concealed-carry-shooting-interview-
met-20151120-story.html; Adam Bates, An Uber Driver With a Concealed Handgun Prevented a Mass Shooting 
in Chicago, BUSINESS INSIDER (Apr. 21, 2015, 11:38 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/uber-driver-with-
concealed-handgun-prevents-mass-shooting-in-chicago-2015-4. 
2. Id.




 7. Id.; Bates, supra note 1. 
8. See Nicholas J. Johnson, Lawful Gun Carriers (Police and Armed Citizens): License, Escalation, and 
Race, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 231 n.3 (2017); John R. Lott Jr., What a Balancing Test Will Show for 
Right-to-Carry Laws, 71 MD. L. REV. 1205, 1207 (2012); Aaron Morrison, Where is it Legal to Carry a Gun? 
List of States with Concealed-Carry Laws, MIC (July 20, 2016), https://mic.com/articles/149325/where-is-it-
legal-to-carry-a-gun-list-of-states-with-concealed-carry-laws#.ggQtnJ6TY; DANIEL W. WEBSTER, CONCEALED
CARRY OF FIREARMS: FACTS VS. FICTION 2 (Nov. 16, 2017) https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-
institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/publications/concealed-carry-of-firearms.pdf
(providing a map of shall-issue versus may-issue states). 
9. See, e.g., Handgun Licensing FAQ, OKLA. ST. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, http://osbi.ok.gov/handgun-
licensing/faq (last visited Nov. 13, 2018); Eligibility Requirements for a Florida Concealed Weapon License,
FLA. DEP?T AGRIC. & CONSUMER SERVS., https://www.freshfromflorida.com/Consumer-Resources/Concealed-
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often restricts public-carry to those applicants who demonstrate some specific, enhanced 
need for self-defense.10
??? ??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
shooting does not exist in isolation. For example, in 2018, a lawfully armed person in 
Florida shot and wounded a gunman who fired multiple rounds in a crowded park at a 
back-to-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
killed an active shooter at a sports bar in Texas.11
Shooting events like these keep the controversy over public-carry squarely at the 
forefront of the national conscience. Simultaneously, courts are struggling to determine 
the extent and the nature of public-carry rights. Specifically, courts are endeavoring to 
determine whether the right to carry firearms in public is constitutionally guaranteed. 
Further, if such a right does exist under the Second Amendment, what type of public-carry 
is guaranteed by the Constitution: concealed-carry, where the firearm is hidden from view; 
open-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
framers intended the Second Amendment to apply only to the maintenance of the 
collective state militias,12 the Supreme Court made it clear in District of Columbia v. 
Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago ????????????????????????????????????????????
individual one that is fully applicable to the states and that protects the right to use 
handguns for self-defense.13
In Heller and McDonald, the Court focused on handgun possession within the home 
and conclusively determined that the in-home possession of handguns is not only a 
constitutionally guaranteed right, but also a fundamental one.14 But what happens when a 
gun owner chooses to carry a firearm beyond the home? Circuits are split over the extent 
to which Heller extends to public settings. The judicial tension seems to stem from the 
varying definitions courts are giving to the core of the Second Amendment because, since 
Heller,???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????? ????
be subjected to a higher standard of judicial scrutiny than a statute that does not.15
                                                          
Weapon-License/Applying-for-a-Concealed-Weapon-License/Eligibility-Requirements (last visited Nov. 13, 
2018). 
10. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:58-4(c); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140 § 131; see also Lott, supra note 8, at 1208; Morrison, supra note 
8. 
 11. Travis Fedschun, Florida Armed Bystander Stops Gunman at Crowded Back-to-School Event at Park, 
Police Say, FOX NEWS (Aug. 6, 2018), http://www.foxnews.com/us/2018/08/06/florida-armed-bystander-stops-
gunman-at-crowded-back-to-school-event-at-park-police-say.html; Phil McCausland, ‘Good Samaritan’ Kills 
Active Shooter in Texas Sports Bar: Police, NBC NEWS (May 4, 2017, 8:40 PM), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/good-samaritan-kills-active-shooter-texas-sports-bar-police-n755136. 
 12. PATRICK J. CHARLES, ARMED IN AMERICA: A HISTORY OF GUN RIGHTS FROM COLONIAL MILITIAS TO 
CONCEALED CARRY 104 (2018); see also Saul Cornell, St. George Tucker and the Second Amendment: Original 
Understandings and Modern Misunderstandings, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1123, 1124?25, 1130 (2006); Richard 
Aborn & Marlene Koury, Toward a Future, Wiser Court: A Blueprint for Overturning District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1353, 1360?62 (2012). 
13. See generally District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 
U.S. 742 (2010). 
14. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628?29; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767, 791. 
15. E.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (?[W]e assume that any law that would 
burden the ?fundamental,? core right of self-defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to 
strict scrutiny. But, as we move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public 
safety interests often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.?) (quoting United States v. Masciandaro, 638 
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134 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:131 
As a starting point, Heller defined the core purpose of the Second Amendment as 
the right to use handguns for self-defense.16 Absent from this definition is the answer to a 
crucial question, the question on which this Note will focus: is the core limited to certain 
locations? Stated more directly, is it limited to the home? As the recent cases of Wrenn v. 
District of Columbia and Young v. Hawaii illustrate, by expanding or contracting the 
??????? ???????????? ?????? ??????? ????? ??????????? ???????????? ??????? ??? ??????????
whether a statute that limits firearm possession outside the home is constitutional.17 Such 
limiting statutes?commonly referred to as good-cause statutes?often restrict the right to 
carry handguns in public to a sub-set of law-abiding citizens who are capable of 
articulating some heightened need of self-defense.18 As will be dissected below, Heller??
discussion of public-carry was ambiguous. However, as interpreted by some lower courts, 
Heller?? language supports the inference that the right to self-defense does reach beyond 
the home and may sit at the core of the Second Amendment.19 If the Supreme Court were 
to reach a decisive conclusion on the matter, the public safety implications could be 
extensive. 
Part I of this Note explores the background of the Second Amendment by 
highlighting the role of the militia during the American Revolution. This section illustrates 
the public admiration of the militia during the colonial period as well as the shared public 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????20 As discussed in other writings, there 
is an argument that the founders did not envision the Second Amendment as a protection 
of individual firearm rights unrelated to state militias but, rather, intended it to provide a 
                                                          
F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011)); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670?71 (1st Cir. 2018) (?In our judgment, the 
appropriate level of scrutiny must turn on how closely a particular law or policy approaches the core of the 
Second Amendment right and how heavily it burdens that right. A law or policy that burdens conduct falling 
within the core of the Second Amendment requires a correspondingly strict level of scrutiny, whereas a law or 
policy that burdens conduct falling outside the core of the Second Amendment logically requires a less 
demanding level of scrutiny.?); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (?We do 
not believe however, that heightened scrutiny must always be akin to strict scrutiny when a law burdens the 
Second Amendment . . . . Although we have no occasion to decide what level of scrutiny should apply to laws 
that burden the ?core? Second Amendment protection identified in Heller, we believe that applying less than strict 
scrutiny when the regulation does not burden the ?core? protection of self-defense in the home makes eminent 
sense . . . ??); see also Sam Zuidema, Raising Heller: Constitutional Scrutiny in a New Age of Second Amendment 
Rights, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 813, 826 (2018) (?Most courts have determined that the core is afforded more 
protection than rights falling within the amendment?s periphery.?). 
 16. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630. 
17. See 864 F.3d 650, 661, 667 (D.C. Cir. 2017); 896 F.3d 1044, 1070?71 (9th Cir. 2018). 
18. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii); HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:58-4(c); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140 § 131; see also Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for 
Carrying Guns in Public, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 218, 218 (2014) (?[S]ome jurisdictions . . . require applicants for 
. . . public carrying licenses to show cause (such as Maryland?s ?good and substantial reason? or New York?s
?special need for self-protection?) for public carrying . . . ??). 
19. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657?58 (discussing their opinion that public-carry lies and the core of the Second 
Amendment and stating that in Heller, the Supreme Court gave ?seemingly equal treatment to the right to ?keep?
and to ?bear,? first defining those ?phrases? and then teasing out their implications. In that long preliminary 
analysis, the Court elaborates that to ?bear? means to ?wear, bear, or carry . . . upon the person . . . in a case of 
conflict with another person. That definition shows that the Amendment?s core must span . . . the ?right to possess 
and carry weapons in case of confrontation.??) (citations omitted); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935?36
(7th Cir. 2012) (?Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment right than the right to have a gun in 
one?s home . . . ??). 
 20. CHARLES, supra note 12, at 104; Nelson Lund, The Right to Keep and Bear Arms in the Roberts Court,
2?3 SSRN, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3038923 (last revised Apr. 5, 2018). 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 71 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 71 Side A      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
CURRY, R - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 1:54 PM 
2019] AN EVOLVING RIGHT 135 
balance against the federal military by granting citizens the right to keep and bear arms in 
the limited context of militia service.21
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????Heller and McDonald. While these 
decisions relied heavily on a historical interpretation of the Second Amendment, in both 
instances, the Court expanded the reach of the widely-believed intent of the framers and 
held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess handguns for self-
defense even in the absence of any militia connection. 
Part III discusses the hotly contested right of public-carry by examining and defining 
good-cause statutes. As previously noted, such statutes often deny public-carry permits to 
law-abiding citizens with no mental health concerns unless the applicant is able to establish 
cause for self-defense over and above the self-protection needs of the general public.22
This portion of the Note also analyzes the public-carry circuit split in light of the recent 
Wrenn and Young decisions, and more specifically, exposes the shifting core of the Second 
Amendment. While Wrenn created the split,23 Young introduced a third interpretation of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????24
Importantly, by order issued on February 8, 2019, the Ninth Circuit has voted to 
rehear Young v. Hawaii en banc.25 However, the date of the rehearing is uncertain because 
on February 14, 2019, the Ninth Circuit issued an order staying the en banc proceeding 
??????????????????????????????????????New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New 
York (a Second Circuit case focused on the constitutionality of a New York City handgun 
licensing scheme that restricts the circumstances under which a licensed firearm can 
legally be transported from a licensed premises).26 The Supreme Court is scheduled to 
hear New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York during its October 2019 
term.27
Regardless of whether courts are reshaping the core as a result of uncertainty or in 
an effort to achieve a desired result, the effect of such expansion or contraction of the core 
?????????????????????????????????definition of the core often determines the level of scrutiny 
that it applies to test the constitutionality of a challenged good-cause statute. Finally, this 
section of the Note discusses two potential flaws in the Young ruling, namely the Ninth 
??????????failure to rule decisively on the constitutionality of good-cause statutes and the 
????????????-application of history during its analysis of the Second Amendment. 
????? ??? ??????? ?????????? ????? ???? ????????? ????????? ??????????????????????? ?????
                                                          
 21. CHARLES, supra note 12, at 104; see also Cornell, supra note 12, at 1124?25, 1130; Aborn & Koury, 
supra note 12, at 1360?62. 
 22. Blocher, supra note 18, at 218. 
 23. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant in Opposition of Rehearing En Banc at 12 n.8, Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 
1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 12-17808) [hereinafter Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant], 
https://www.ar15.com/forums/general/Response-to-En-Banc-Petition-in-Young-v-State-of-Hawaii-filed/5-
2163534/ (stating, ?[t]o be sure, there is conflict between the holding in Wrenn that a ?good cause? requirement 
is facially unconstitutional, and the holdings in Gould, Woollard, Kachalsky and Drake, that a ?good cause?
requirement facially comports with the Second Amendment?). 
 24. 896 F.3d at 1070. 
 25. Order Granting En Banc Rehearing, 915 F.3d 681 (9th Cir. 2019). 
 26. Order Staying En Banc Rehearing, No. 12-17808 (9th Cir. Feb. 14, 2019) (D.C. No. 1:12-cv-0036-HG-
BMK); New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass?n v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018). 
27. Supreme Court of the United States Granted & Noted List October Term 2019 Cases for Argument,
SUPREME COURT U.S. (Jan. 22, 2019), https://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/19grantednotedlist.pdf. 
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appears to have grown since Heller. Given the current spotlight on the core, this Part 
argues that the concept of the core is possibly being rendered unnecessarily abstract as a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Amendment to have a core in the first place. This portion of the Note suggests, based on 




Given the shifting nature of the core, Part VI concludes by arguing that the 
disagreement among the circuits regarding the right to carry handguns in public makes 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-shooting 
society, the public safety implications of a Supreme Court ruling placing the right of 
public-carry either inside or outside of the core of the Second Amendment could be 
profound.28
II. THE ORIGINAL PURPOSE OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
PRESERVATION OF STATE MILITIAS 
The Revolutionary War began on April 19, 1775, with the Battles of Lexington and 
Concord.29 These battles were the American response to increasing tension between 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????30 At this point 
in American history, militias were recognized by some as an established defense system, 
as many militia-men had fought in the French and Indian War and were formidable 
combatants.31 As a result, when 20,000 colonists intercepted British troops on the 
Lexington town square, they forced a retreat.32 In the early days of the war, the colonists 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????inst the Crown.33 However, 
as the war progressed, national leaders began to doubt whether national security was 
sufficiently safe in the hands of the militia system.34 Shortly after the Revolution began, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
George Washington Commander-in-Chief.35 After joining his troops, Washington found 
disarray.36 Desertion was commonplace and leadership was poor.37 In light of his 
observations, Washington wrote Congress and said: 
To place any dependence upon Militia, is, assuredly, resting upon a broken staff. Men just 
                                                          
 28. I assert that the public safety impact could be profound because, although the majority of states are shall-
issue states, those states that are may-issue are some of the nation?s most populous. As a result, a Supreme Court 
ruling that placed public carry at the core of the Second Amendment would affect millions of Americans. See
WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 2. 
 29. Battles of Lexington and Concord, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/american-
revolution/battles-of-lexington-and-concord (last visited Sept. 4, 2018). 
30. Id.
 31. MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A BIOGRAPHY 10 (2014). 
 32. Battles of Lexington and Concord, supra note 29; WALDMAN, supra note 31, at 10. 
 33. WALDMAN, supra note 31, at 11. 
34. Id. at 12?13. 
35. Id. at 13?14. 
36. Id. at 14. 
37. Id.
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dragged from the tender scenes of domestic life; unaccustomed to the din of arms; totally 
unacquainted with every kind of military skill . . . [are] timid and ready to fly from their own 
shadows. Besides, the sudden change in their manner of living . . . produces shameful, and 
scandalous desertions . . . . Certain I am, that it would be cheaper to keep 50,000 or 100,000 
men in constant pay than to depend upon half the number, and supply the other half 
occasionally with militia.38
As Michael Waldman argued in his book The Second Amendment: A Biography,
?????? ??????? ????? ???????? ????? ???????? ?????????? ?????? ????? ????????? ??????? ???????
classes. Certainly the American Revolution did that. Among other things, it instantly began 
to school its leaders in the limits of the much romanticized militia system and the role of 
???? ???????? ?????????39 The lessons learned in war were not forgotten during the 
Constitutional Convention, and they provided the backdrop that resulted in the granting of 
significant power to the federal government to maintain a national military and regulate 
the militia.40
A centralization of military power was a concern among the people when the Bill of 
Rights was drafted, and the framers were sensitive to the public disquiet.41 Recognizing 
that a standing military was a potential danger to individual liberty, the founders believed 
the state militias provided a necessary barrier against oppressive federal power.42 This was 
the mindset that led to the inclusion of the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights,43
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????44
The Founding Fathers viewed the Amendment as a constitutional protection against 
a standing military.45 ?????????????? ?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
???? ???????? ???????????? ????? ????? ???? ??????? ??? ??????????? ????? ???? ????????? ????
???????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ?????????46 Thus, 
the addition of the Amendment was perceived to balance control over the militia in the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????ice,
the ability of the people to defend their liberty was maintained.47
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the notion of the right to do so for the purpose of individual self-defense. During 
ratification, which included ardent discussion, writings, and speeches, concerns that the 
government would infringe upon individual gun possession rights were infrequently 
raised.48 ??? ?????? ??????? ????? ???????????? ?????? ??? ???????? ?? ??rearm with which to 
confront Everardo Custodio did not appear to be one of the founders? driving concerns. 
                                                          
 38. WALDMAN, supra note 31, at 14?15. 
39. Id. at 12?13. 
 40. Lund, supra note 20, at 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12?16. 
 41. Lund, supra note 20, at 2. 
 42. CHARLES, supra note 12, at 104. 
43. Id.
 44. U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 45. CHARLES, supra note 12, at 70. 
46. Id. at 100 (quoting founding-era law professor, St. George Tucker). 
47. See id.
 48. WALDMAN, supra note 31, at 43. 
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III. THE HELLER EFFECT?DESPITE THE PURPOSE OF ITS CODIFICATION,
THE SECOND AMENDMENT GUARANTEES AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO
KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
??????????????????????????????????????????? the general understanding of the Second 
Amendment changed during the nineteenth century.49 Increasingly, it became more 
associated with individual self-defense and less with militia service.50 Several factors 
????????????????????????????????????????????????he decline of the militia, the expansion of 
the United States, changes in constitutional drafting, legal commentary and opinions as to 
what the Second Amendment and the right to arms afforded, and varying public attitudes 
. . . on the ownership . . . of arms . . . ??51 Surprisingly, it took over 200 years from its 
ratification for the United States Supreme Court to conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
?????????????????????????????52 That does not mean that the Court has never analyzed 
the Amendment, but a review of pre-Heller Supreme Court precedent reveals that no law 
regulating firearm possession had ever been declared unconstitutional.53 Prior to Heller,
the Court viewed the right of individual firearm possession to exist only in the context of 
militia service.54 However, in a contentious five to four decision in 2008, Heller changed 
the narrative. 
Dick Heller was a special police officer who was permitted to possess a handgun 
while on duty.55 He attempted to register his weapon to keep it at home as well, but he 
was denied due to District of Columbia Code provisions that generally prohibited the 
registration of handguns.56 Heller filed suit against the District on Second Amendment 
                                                          
 49. CHARLES, supra note 12, at 122. 
50. Id.
51. Id.
 52. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (?[T]his case represents this Court?s first in-
depth examination of the Second Amendment . . . ??). 
 53. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 956 (2015); see also 
ROOSEVELT THOREAU, THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN A MODERN AMERICA: THE ORIGINAL INTENT OF THE 
SECOND AMENDMENT, THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS THAT DEFINE IT, & THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR 
ARMS IN A VIOLENT SOCIETY 9?11 (2017); see also, e.g., United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (?In 
the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ?shotgun having a barrel of less eighteen 
inches in length? . . . has some reasonable relationship to the preservation . . . of a well regulated militia, we 
cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.?); Miller v. 
Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894) (referring to Defendant?s claim that a Texas statute violated his Second 
Amendment rights, the Court concluded ?[w]e have examined the record in vain, however, to find where the 
defendant was denied the benefit to any of these provisions, and, even if he were, it is well settled that the 
restrictions of these amendments operates only upon the federal power, and have no reference whatever to 
proceedings in state courts?); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (?The second amendment 
declares [the right to bear arms for a lawful purpose] shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means no 
more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than 
to restrict the powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection against any 
violation by their fellow citizens of the rights it recognizes, to . . . the ?powers which related to merely municipal 
legislation . . . ???); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (citing favorably the above passage from 
Cruikshank).
54. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (stating that possession of the sawed off shotgun in question was not protected 
by the Second Amendment because such weapons did not have a reasonable relationship to the preservation of a 
well-regulated militia); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 956. 
 55. Heller, 554 U.S at 575. 
56. Id. at 575. 
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grounds, seeking to enjoin the city from enforcing the provisions.57
In the Heller majority opinion, Justice Scalia expressly agreed that the original 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
militia.58 The Court then reasoned that the purpose behind the codification of the 
Amendment was only part of the story. It highlighted the fact that the Second Amendment 
??????????????????????? ????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to keep and ????????????????????????????????????59 The Court concluded that the prefatory 
clause did not limit the right granted by the operative clause, but simply announced the 
reason for its inclusion in the Bill of Rights.60 This purpose-only view of the prefatory 
clause meant that it need not be considered when determining the scope of the right granted 
by the Amendment.61 The majority reasoned that the guarantee?????? ????????? ?????????
[individual] self-????????62?was revealed in the operative clause which the Court defined 
????????central component ?????????????????????63
For some, including the dissent, this interpretation of the effect?or lack of effect?
that the clauses of the Second Amendment have on one another was a dramatic shift in 
thinking.64 By disregarding th?? ?????????? ??????? ??? ????????? ???? ???????????????????
guarantee, the majority expressly acknowledged what it considered to be an appropriate 
??????????? ??? ???? ??????????? ????????? ?? ????? ?????????? ???????? ??? ?????????? ??? ????
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall not be 
???????????65
After pronouncing that the Second Amendment secures an individual right to 
possess handguns for self-defense, the Court drew several conclusions that are currently 
proving both central and problematic to the circuits as they struggle to determine 
whether?and to what extent?Heller protects an individual firearm possession right 
??????? ???? ?????? ??????? ?????????? ?????? ????? ????? ????? ??????? ????????? ??? ???? ???????
Amendment is the individual right to use operable handguns for self-defense.66 Next, it 
observed that the need for self-defense is most acute within the home.67 Further, and 
similarly, the Court opined that the right of law-abiding citizens to use handguns in defense 
of their homes is elevated above all other interests.68 Finally, while ruling out rational 
basis as a viable option, the Court left open the question of the appropriate level of scrutiny 
                                                          
57. Id at 575?76.
58. Id. at 599. 
59. Id. at 576?77. 
60. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577. 
61. Id. at 578; see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Heller 
and reasoning that ?while preventing Congress from eliminating state militias was the ?purpose that prompted 
the [Amendment?s] codification,? that purpose did not limit the right?s substance, which encompassed the 
personal right to armed self-defense?). 
62. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
63. See id. at 592, 599. 
64. Id. at 640?43. 
65. Id. at 577. 
66. Id. at 630; see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767?68 (2010) (confirming the core 
protection guaranteed in Heller); Zuidema, supra note 15, at 826. 
67. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628. 
68. Id. at 635. 
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to apply to challenged Second Amendment regulations.69
These pronouncements from Heller raise several issues: if the core of the Second 
Amendment is an individual right to keep handguns for self-defense, is that core limited 
to the home?the realm in which the need is most acute? Does the fact that the need for 
self-defense is most acute in the home mean that, in public settings, the core is not 
triggered? Moreover, while the Court made it clear that a ban on handgun possession in 
the home would likely fail under any standard of judicial scrutiny, does that necessarily 
mean that restrictions on handgun possession in public would survive some appropriate 
level of scrutiny? If so, what is the appropriate level? 
In 2010, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, two Chicagoans brought an action 
??????????? ???? ?????????????????? ??? ???? ??????? ???????? ????? ????? ?????????? ????????? ????
keeping handguns at home, the Supreme Court revisited the matter and left these questions 
unanswered.70 What McDonald did announce was that the Second Amendment guarantee 
in Heller, and the unanswered questions presented, are not solely a federal problem. 
McDonald reiterated that the individual right of self-defense is the central component of 
the Second Amendment,71 ???? ??? ??????? ??? ???? ??????????????????????? ???? ????????
clause, is applicable to the states.72 As a direct result of McDonald, state and local gun 
laws were opened to Second Amendment challenges.73
In short, while clearly pronouncing a right to possess handguns at home for self-
defense, Heller and McDonald generated more questions than they answered. As Heller 
??????? ???????? ??????? ????? ????? ??????????? ????? ???????? ?????? ??-depth examination of the 
Second Amendment, one should not expect it to clarify the entire field . . . ??74 In no area 
is this lack of clarification more apparent than in the arena of the right to bear arms in 
public. The quagmire regarding the extension of Heller beyond the home was summarized 
by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Masciandaro, when Justice Niemeyer, seemingly 
conveying a sense of frustration, stated: 
There may or may not be a Second Amendment right in some places beyond the home, but 
we have no idea what those places are, what the criteria for selecting them should be, what 
sliding scales of scrutiny might apply to them, or any one of a number of other questions 
. . . . The whole matter strikes us as a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon 
necessity and only then by small degree.75
IV. THE SHIFTING CORE: DOES HELLER EXTEND BEYOND THE HOME? 
The confusion expressed in Masciandaro is deepened by the fact that Heller and 
McDonald noted that, although the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment is 
fundamental, it is not absolute.76 As Justice Scalia stated in Heller??????????????????????????
                                                          
69. Id. at 628 n.27. 
70. See generally 561 U.S. 742. 
71. Id. at 767. 
72. Id. at 791. 
 73. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 53, at 959. 
 74. 554 U.S. 570 at 635. 
 75. 638 F.3d 458, 475 (4th Cir. 2011). 
76. McDonald, 561 U.S. at 801?02 (Scalia, J., concurring); Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (?Like most rights, the 
right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited.?); CHEMERINSKY supra note 53, at 958. 
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should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms 
by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive 
places . . . ??77 Recall however, that Heller also seemed to imply that a statute that destroys 
the core purpose?or central component?of the Amendment will likely fail under any 
level of judicial scrutiny.78 Thus, lower courts currently have two guideposts regarding 
the constitutionality of statutes that restrict Second Amendment rights: first, legislatures 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
beyond the core purpose may be regulated so long as the regulation withstands the 
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny?whatever level that might be. 
A. The Constitutionality of Good-Cause Statutes 
Good-cause statutes, and their relationship to the core of the Second Amendment, 
are at the heart of the public-carry circuit split.79 While such statutory schemes carry 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????80 ???????????????????81 ?????????????
??????82 ??????????????????????????????83 ??????????-caus???84 they all stand for the idea 
that a state retains the authority to deny an individual the privilege to carry a handgun 
beyond the home unless the applicant articulates some need for protection greater than the 
need of the general public.85
In such jurisdictions, concerns which commonly lead to a desire to be armed, like 
working or residing in high-crime areas, are insufficient justifications.86 By their very 
design, good-cause statutes limit the public-carry rights of law-abiding citizens. These 
statutes seek the promotion of public safety through the theory that fewer guns equate to a 
decrease in public safety risks.87 As the theory goes, allowing people with vague safety 
concerns to carry firearms outside the home increases the danger to the public because 
armed persons will expose the public to risk if they choose to use their weapons.88 It is 
important to note that while may-issue states that enforce good-cause statutes are 
numerical outliers, their impact on the public-carry discussion is profound because they 
                                                          
 77. 554 U.S. at 626. 
78. See id. at 628?30. 
 79. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 23, at 12 n.8 (stating, ?[t]o be sure, there is conflict between the 
holding in Wrenn that a ?good cause? requirement is facially unconstitutional, and the holdings in Gould,
Woollard, Kachalsky and Drake, that a ?good cause? requirement facially comports with the Second 
Amendment?). 
 80. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140 § 131(d). 
 81. HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9(a). 
 82. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4(c). 
 83. MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(6)(ii). 
 84. N.Y. PENAL LAW §400.00(2)(f). 
85. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. PUB. SAFETY § 5-306; HAW. REV. STAT. § 134-9; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:58-4; 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140 § 131(d). 
86. E.g., Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (?[L]iving or working ?in a high 
crime area shall not by itself establish a good reason? to carry . . . ??); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 
F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012) (?A generalized desire to carry a concealed weapon to protect one?s person and 
property does not constitute ?proper cause.??); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 870 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(?[A]pprehended danger cannot be established by . . . a ?vague threat? or a general fear of ?liv[ing] in a dangerous 
society.??). 
 87. See Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 439 (3d Cir. 2013). 
88. See id.
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include some of the most populous states in the nation.89 In contrast, recall that the 
majority of states have adopted shall-issue statutes and grant public-carry licenses to all 
law-abiding citizens with no mental health concerns or significant criminal records without 
requiring any special showing of need for self-defense.90
B. Conflicting Views of the Second Amendment’s Core: Analysis of the Circuit Split 
Prior to Young v. Hawaii
To date, the constitutionality of good-cause statutes has turned on the examining 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????91 As will be explored 
below, circuits that place public-carry outside the core have upheld good-cause statutes 
when challenged on Second Amendment grounds. On the other hand, circuits that situate 
public-carry within the core have struck down good-cause statutes as impermissible 
constitutional infringements. 
i. The Restricted Core: According to Heller, the Core Guarantee of the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms is Limited to the Home 
The initial circuit court opinion on the right to carry a handgun in public for self-
defense was offered by the Second Circuit.92 In Kachalsky v. County of Westchester,
several plaintiffs sought licenses to carry concealed handguns; each was denied for failure 
??? ?????????? ???????-??????? ??? ????????? ?????????????? ?????????? ????????93 Relying on 
Heller, the complainants argued that the proper-cause requirement was an unconstitutional 
restraint on their Second Amendment rights.94 The Kachalsky court noted that while 
proper-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general community or of 
????????????????????????????????????????95
While analyzing the challenged statute, the Kachalsky court conceded that, in the 
wake of Heller, the extent of the Second Amendment guarantee beyond the home is 
unknown.96 The Second Circuit then made an important assumption when it observed that 
?????????????????????????????????????????lying the Second Amendment have arisen only 
in connection with prohibitions on the possession of firearms in the home . . . [,] the 
Amendment must have some application in the very different context of the public 
????????????????????????97 It then turned its attention to the appropriate level of scrutiny to 
                                                          
89. See WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 2. 
90. Id; Johnson, supra note 8, at 231 n.3; see also Handgun Licensing FAQ, supra note 9; Eligibility 
Requirements for a Florida Concealed Weapon License, supra note 9. 
91. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93?94, 101 (upholding a good-cause statute after first determining that public-
carry did not lie at the core of the Second Amendment); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671, 675 (1st Cir. 2018) 
(upholding a good-cause statute after first determining that public-carry does not lie at the core); Wrenn, 864 
F.3d at 661, 665?66 (striking down a good-cause statute after determining that public-carry is part of the Second 
Amendment?s core guarantee). 
92. See generally Kachalsky, 701 F.3d 81. 
93. Id. at 83?84; N.Y. PENAL LAW §400.00(2)(f). 
94. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 88. 
95. Id. at 86. 
96. Id. at 89. 
97. Id.
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apply to the challenged statute.98 In doing so, the court focused on defining the core of the 
Second Amendment because it reasoned that a lower level of scrutiny could be applied to 
a statute that does not infringe on the core than could be applied to a statute that does.99
The Second Circuit then invoked Heller in support of a restricted view of the core 
????????????????Heller ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????100
Accordingly, the Kachalsky ??????????????????????????????????????-cause statute, which 
only affected the right to possess firearms in public, was not a restriction on the core.101
By ??????????? own estimation, its finding that the challenged statute did not implicate the 
core permitted it to apply intermediate scrutiny.102 This narrow interpretation of the core 
allowed the court to weigh the individual right to possess a handgun in public (absent the 
demonstration of a special need for self-????????? ??????? ???? ???????? ?????????? ??? ??????
prevention and public safety.103 While conducting its analysis, the Kachalsky court 
acknowledged that if the statute had burdened the core of the Second Amendment, the 
application of a higher level of scrutiny would likely have been required.104 However, 
upon finding that the core was not impacted, the court observed that the proper-cause 
?????????????????????????????????? ??? ???? ???????? ??????????????????????public safety, and, 
accordingly, ruled that the statute, which limited lawful handgun possession to a subset of 
law-abiding citizens (those able to demonstrate proper-cause), was constitutional.105
As evidenced by similar rulings from the First, Third, and Fourth Circuits, the core 
as defined by Kachalsky is logical and can be reasonably inferred from Heller.106 These 
circuits have followed Kachalsky?? lead and upheld good-cause statutes under 
intermediate scrutiny reasoning that, although such statutes do infringe Second 
?????????? ???????? ????? ??? ???? ????????? ???? ???????????? ?????107 While Heller??
pronouncement of a core lawful purpose of self-defense does not seem to implicate any 
location-?????????????????????????????????????? adamant tone regarding the sanctity of the 
right to self-defense within the home cannot be ignored. Far from ignoring it, Kachalsky
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
98. Id. at 93. 
99. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 93. 
100. Id.
101. Id. at 94. 
102. See id. at 96?97. 
103. See id. at 98?99. 
104. See 701 F.3d at 93 (discussing the ban struck down in Heller and noting that certain handgun restrictions 
may fail under any standard of judicial scrutiny). 
105. Id. at 98?99. 
 106. Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 436 (3d Cir. 2013) (?[T]he core of the right conferred upon individuals by 
the Second Amendment is the right to possess usable handguns in the home for self-defense.?); Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 874 (4th Cir. 2013) (?Heller . . . was principally concerned with the ?core protection?
of the Second Amendment: ?the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and 
home.??); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 671 (1st Cir. 2018) (?[T]he core Second Amendment right is limited 
to self-defense in the home.?). 
107. Woollard, 712 F.3d at 876; Gould, 907 F.3d at 672?73, 675. Note that the Third Circuit actually did not 
determine that the challenged statute in Drake needed to withstand intermediate scrutiny because it did not burden 
conduct protected by the Second Amendment. However, in dicta, the court noted that if the statute had been 
subjected to intermediate scrutiny it would have passed constitutional muster under that standard. Drake, 724 
F.3d at 429?30, 436. 
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is not without its detractors, and it has its weaknesses. Consider again Kachalsky??
??????????????? ??? ???? ?????? ?Heller ????????? ????? ???? ??????? ??????????? ??? ???? ???????
?????????? ??? ???? ?????????? ???-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of 
??????????????????108 While it is sensible to surmise that Kachalsky?? interpretation of the 
core is what Heller meant, that is not exactly what Heller said. 
While Heller noted that the Second Amendment elevates, above all other interests, 
the right to possess handguns in the home,109 the contested statute in Heller had no 
application outside the home.110 Therefore, arguably, a definitive beyond-the-home 
examination of Second Amendment rights would have been unnecessary.111 Heller simply 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-defense,112
???????????????????????????????????????????????-defense is central to the Second Amendment 
???????113 If the core of the Second Amendment is the right to self-defense, does it not 
follow that when the need to defend oneself arises beyond the home, the core is 
triggered?114 Can it be that every time a person exits her front door she forfeits this right? 
?????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ????????????????? ???????????????????
???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? driver 
can be an inherently dangerous one.115 Uber drivers inevitably contact, and are confined 
in a vehicle with, strangers, often in groups, who display a wide range of sanity, sobriety, 
and emotional states. For many considering such employment, this risk may be tempered 
by laws that allow them to carry firearms for self-defense. However, if Mr. Hendricks lived 
in New York, he simply could not choose to do so because a general, unspecified desire 
for self-protection is insufficient to establish proper-cause.116 As a result, Mr. Hendricks 
would have a decision to make. Some would argue that the simplest solution would be to 
find another job. But what if Mr. Hendricks, for a variety of legitimate reasons, was unable 
to do so and working as an Uber driver remained his best or only option? He would be 
forced either to carry a firearm in violation of the law to defend himself if necessary, or 
routinely expose himself to potentially dangerous situations with no means of self-
protection. Arguably, this is a choice between equally poor alternatives. By concluding 
that a right to public-carry lies at the core of the Second Amendment guarantee, other 
                                                          
 108. 701 F.3d at 93. 
 109. 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008). 
110. Id. at 575?76; see also Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1069 (2018) (stating ?we afford little weight to 
Heller’s emphasis on the application of the Second Amendment to the home specifically, for the challenge there 
exclusively concerned handgun possession in the home?). 
111. See Young, 896 F.3d at 1069 (stating ?we afford little weight to Heller’s emphasis on the application of 
the Second Amendment to the home specifically, for the challenge there exclusively concerned handgun 
possession in the home?). 
 112. 554 U.S. at 630. 
113. Id. at 628. 
 114. See Blocher, supra note 18, at 219?20 (?If a person . . . wants a gun because he is in immediate danger of 
being killed by violent criminals . . . then his claim to carry a weapon in public would fall squarely within the 
?core? interest of self-defense.?). 
115. See, e.g., Crystal Hill, 75-Year-Old Uber Driver was Picking up a Rider. An Attack Almost Took his Life, 
he Says, MIAMI HERALD (June 22, 2018, 4:50 PM), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-
world/national/article213676669.html; Travis Fedschun, Las Vegas Uber Driver Pummeled by Passengers in 
Attack Caught on Video, FOX NEWS (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.foxnews.com/us/uber-driver-in-las-vegas-
attacked-by-passengers-after-refusing-to-give-ride. 
 116. Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 86 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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circuits provide individuals, like Mr. Hendricks, who desire to carry handguns for self-
defense with a more attractive option. 
ii. The Expanded Core: According to Heller, the Core Guarantee of the Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms is Fully Applicable in Public 
Disagreement with Kachalsky was immediate. Fifteen days after the Second 
???????????????????????????????????????????????at the right to self-defense extends beyond 
the home.117 In Moore v. Madigan, the appellants argued that an Illinois law that 
prohibited individuals, other than police officers and security guards, from carrying guns 
in public ran afoul of the Second Amendment as interpreted by Heller.118 While the Moore 
?????????????????????????????????????????-carry statute,119 it outlined the logic by which such 
a statute could be deemed unconstitutional. In Moore, Judge Posner dissected Heller??
reasoning that the need for self-defense is most acute inside the home, and he noted that 
Heller did not imply that the need to defend oneself has no salience in other locations.120
Importantly, Judge Posner observed that the Second Amendment encompasses both a right 
to bear arms as well as a right to keep them,121 and reasoned that the right to bear arms 
seems to extend beyond the home.122 Although Moore gave little attention to the 
boundaries of the core, it provided a roadmap by which a court could expand the core 
beyond that adopted by Kachalsky. In 2017, the D.C. Circuit took that opportunity. 
In Wrenn v. District of Columbia, two plaintiffs filed suit, claiming that their Second 
Amendment rights were violated after they were denied concealed-carry licenses (the only 
method of carry allowed under the D.C. Code)123 because of their inability to show a 
special need for self-defense.124 Under the D.C. good-cause statute, concealed-carry 
????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????125 Good 
reason was interpret??? ??? ??? ???????? ????? ???? ????-protection distinguishable from the 
general community as supported by evidence of specific threats or previous attacks that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????126
The D.C. Circuit signaled a pending circuit split when it offered its interpretation of 
the core of the Second Amendment, which contrasted notably with the interpretation of 
the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. As understood by Wrenn????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
self-????????????????-????????????????????????????????127 This interpretation, which did not 
signal any type of home-based limitation, was then directly applied to the question of 
                                                          
 117. Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935?36 (7th Cir. 2012). 
118. Id. at 934?35. 
119. Id. at 942 (The Court did not immediately strike down the law. Instead it gave the state Legislature 180 
days to craft a new gun law ?consistent with . . . public safety and the Second Amendment?). 
120. Id. at 935. 
121. Id. at 936. 
122. Moore, 702 F.3d at 936. 
 123. 864 F.3d 650, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
124. Id.
125. Id. at 655. 
126. Id.
127. Id. at 657. 
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whether the core extended to public-carry.128 Wrenn reasoned that if the core guarantee is 
the right to self-defense, Heller?? ???????????????????????????????-defense at home is the 
only ????????? ??????????????????????129 Following Moore?? template, the D.C. Circuit 
argued in favor of their view by emphasizing that the Second Amendment includes both a 
right to keep130 and a right to bear,131 and pointed out that in Heller, the Supreme Court 
gave seemingly equal treatment to these independent concepts despite the fact that the 
specific facts of Heller arguably only involved the right to keep arms.132 Wrenn then set a 
???? ??????? ???? ????????? ???? ????? ??? ???? ??????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ????? ?????
individual right to carry common firearms beyond the home for self-defense?even in 
densely populated areas, even for those lacking special self-defense needs?falls within 
???????????????????????????????????????????????133
After determining that public-carry is part of the core guarantee, the D.C. Circuit 
turned its attention to the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to the challenged statute.134
It held that the D.C. good-reason law was a total ban enacted against most law-abiding 
citizens, namely those who lacked a special need for self-defense, and therefore it 
destroyed the Second Amendment guarantee of the very class it was designed to protect: 
law-abiding citizens.135 Accordingly, the Wrenn court took the Heller approach and 
declined to apply any level of scrutiny, holding that such a destruction of the core of the 
Second Amendment would fail any judicial test.136
The core as defined by Wrenn was a vast extension of the core contemplated by 
Kachalsky and its progeny. Although both variants find support in Heller, the Wrenn 
interpretation, that the core encompasses a right to public-carry even in the absence of a 
heightened need for self-defense, is on more equal footing with Heller. As previously 
discussed, while Heller limited its holding to the home, the challenged statute in that case 
was a ban on the possession of operable handguns in the home.137 Arguably, such a statute 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to public settings). Nonetheless, as noted by Wrenn, the Heller Court felt compelled to 
devote a considerable portion of its opinion to the discussion of the meaning of ???????????
                                                          
128. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657. 
129. Id. (emphasis added). 
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 657; see also PATRICK J. CHARLES, HISTORICISM, ORIGINALISM, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE USE 
AND ABUSE OF THE PAST IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 122?23 (2014) (?To be clear, according to the tenets of 
originalism, the Second Amendment protects the right to ?keep arms? and the right to ?bear arms.? The right to 
?keep arms? embodies a right to retain, have in custody or have weapons, and [the] right to ?bear arms? is 
understood as a right to carry.?). 
 133. 864 F.3d at 661. 
134. Id. at 664. 
135. Id. at 664?66. 
136. Id. at 665?66. 
 137. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575?76 (2008); see also Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 
1069 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating, ?we afford little weight to Heller’s emphasis on the application of the Second 
Amendment to the home specifically, for the challenge there exclusively concerned handgun possession in the 
home?). 
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?????????????????????????????????138 In doing so, the Supreme Court reasoned that the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in a pocket.139 As pointed out by the D.C. Circuit, in Heller, the highest Court gave no 
indication that the right to bear arms was inferior to the right to keep them.140 Further, 
recall that the core lawful purpose of the Second Amendment as defined by Heller is to 
guarantee an individual right to use handguns for self-defense.141 While it was Heller??
opinion that this right is at its apex in the home,142 it seems to cut against the spirit of 
Heller to conclude that individuals forgo their self-defense right on the ground that, while 
in public, their need to exercise that right is less critical in the eyes of the judiciary.143
Wrenn?? beyond-the-home expansion of the core Second Amendment guarantee was 
the antithesis of the core as interpreted by the Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. Wrenn
created divergent views of the scope of the constitutional right to bear arms. Accordingly, 
when the Ninth Circuit took up the issue in Young v. Hawaii, it had two apparent options 
to choose from?either the core is limited to the home, or it extends to the public. In a 
sense, the Young court rejected both and shifted the core in a new direction. 
C. The Contribution of Young v. Hawaii: The Shifting Core of the Right to Keep and 
Bear Arms Exposed 
Young v. Hawaii ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
carry firearms in public. In the 2016 en banc ruling of Peruta v. County of San Diego, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that the Second Amendment does not, in any manner, protect an 
individual right to carry concealed firearms beyond the home.144 Interestingly, and 
perhaps as a harbinger of Young, the Peruta court went out of its way to address the issue 
of open-carry by noting that, although there is no concealed-carry right, there may or may 
not be an individual Second Amendment right to carry firearms in public in some 
manner.145
During the summer of 2018, the Ninth Circuit revisited the issue in Young and 
concluded that while there is no constitutional right to concealed-carry,146 the Second 
Amendment does, at its core, protect the right of law-abiding citizens to carry firearms 
openly in public.147 While this interpretation of the core is more similar to Wrenn than 
Kachalsky in that it includes some method of public-carry, it is distinct from all previous 
                                                          
138. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657 (referencing Heller and stating that ?the Court . . . spent over fifty pages giving 
independent and seemingly equal treatment to the right to ?keep? and to ?bear,? first defining those ?phrases? and 
then teasing out their implications?). 
 139. Heller, 554 U.S. at 584. 
140. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657. 
 141. 554 U.S. at 630. 
142. Id. at 628, 635. 
143. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935?36 (7th Cir. 2012) (?Both Heller and McDonald do say that 
?the need for defense of self, family, and property is most acute? in the home, but that doesn?t mean it is not acute 
outside the home. Heller repeatedly invokes a broader Second Amendment right than the right to have a gun in 
one?s home . . . ??) (internal citations omitted). 
 144. 824 F.3d 919, 924, 939 (9th Cir. 2016). 
145. Id. at 927, 939. 
 146. Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044, 1068 (2018). 
147. Id. at 1070. 
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 77 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
41647-tul_55-1 Sheet No. 77 Side B      09/18/2019   11:37:45
C M
Y K
CURRY, R - FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 9/17/2019 1:54 PM 
148 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55:131 
circuit level interpretations of the core. The core as defined by Young includes only a right 
to a specific manner of public-carry?open-carry?and thus illustrates that the Second 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????rpretations. 
The holding in Young has two notable deficiencies. First, the Ninth Circuit sent 
mixed signals regarding the constitutionality of good-cause statutes that fall short of 
complete bans on public-carry. Second, the Young court over-utilized the historical 
approach to Second Amendment analysis by using history to pinpoint a precise method of 
public-????????????????????????????????????????
i. The Young ????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
???
Young centered on the constitu?????????? ??? ????????? ????-cause statute.148 The 
specific statute offered limited exceptions to the general statutory scheme restricting 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????149 In order to carry a concealed 
firearm, the statute required a de???????????? ??? ???? ???????????? ?????? ??? ?????? ????
applicant show[ed] reason to fear injury??150 Regarding open-carry, an applicant was 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ????????????????????????????? ??? ?????????????????? ???????????????????151
Hawaii County later promoted regulations that clarified the open-carry standard essentially 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
open-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????152 Seeking to carry in either 
fashion (openly or concealed), George Young, the petitioner, was twice denied by Hawaii 




The Ninth Circuit conducted an exhaustive historical analysis of gun rights similar 
to and overlapping with the analysis done in Heller.155 Although the method of analysis 
was similar, Young?? objective was different. Recall that Heller looked to history to 
determine whether an individual right of self-defense existed.156 Moving forward from 
                                                          
 148. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-9. 
149. Young, 896 F.3d at 1048; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 134-23, 134-24, 134-25. 
 150. HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 134-9. 
151. Id.
152. Young, 896 F.3d at 1048. But see Defendant-Appellees Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8?9, Young v. 
Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 12-17808) (stating that the Court characterization of the open-carry 






153. Young, 896 F.3d at 1048. 
154. Id. at 1049?50. 
155. Id. at 1052?64. 
156. See Heller v. District of Columbia, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (?Putting all these textual elements together, 
we find that they guarantee the individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. This 
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Heller?? conclusion that such a right does exist, Young utilized history to determine the 
scope and the precise nature of the right.157 Following its analysis of history, the Young 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????some right to self-defense in 
????????158 ???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
Amendment rights.159 The Ninth Circuit then contemplated the appropriate level of 
scrutiny to apply to the challenged statute.160 In doing so, it ?????????????????????????????
how close the law c[ame] to the core of the Second Amendment right, and (2) the severity 
??????????????????????????????????161 The Ninth Circuit reasoned, as had other courts that 
had previously taken up the issue, that a law which so restricted the core that it effectively 
destroyed the Second Amendment guarantee would likely fail under any level of 
scrutiny.162 On the other hand, the Young court noted that the application of intermediate 
scrutiny was appropriate if the challenged statute did not implicate the core.163
The Ninth Circuit focused on Heller?? implication that the core purpose of the 
Second Amendment right?self-defense?is not limited to the home164 ?????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ates the core purpose of self-
???????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????165 The Young court then fell back on its holding in Peruta and reasoned that, 
although there is no constitutional right to carry a firearm in a concealed manner,166 the 
??????? ??? ?????? ?? ???????? ??????? ???? ????-defense falls within the core of the Second 
???????????167 Upon finding that the core guarantee includes a right to open-carry, the 
Young ???????????????? ??????????????????ich limited open-???????????????????????????????
??????????? ??? ????? ???? ??????????168 The court observed that the Second Amendment 
protects law-abiding citizens, and therefore, it must secure a right to bear arms for typical 
members of that class.169 Accordingl???????????????? ????????????????? ???????????????????????
to open-carry to security guards and others similarly situated,170 excluded the majority of 
the class it was intended to protect, and therefore it would fail under any level of judicial 
scrutiny.171
                                                          
meaning is strongly confirmed by the historical background of the Second Amendment.?). 
157. Young, 896 F.3d at 1068 (?Concluding our analysis of text and review of history, we remain unpersuaded 
. . . that the Second Amendment only has force within the home. Once identified as an individual right focused 
on self-defense, the right to bear arms must guarantee some right to self-defense in public. While the concealed 
carry of firearms categorically falls outside such protection, we are satisfied that the Second Amendment 





162. Young, 896 F.3d at 1068. 
163. Id.
164. Id. at 1069. 
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1068. 
167. Young, 896 F.3d at 1070.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 1071. 
170. Id.
171. Id.
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In ????? ???????????????????? ??????? ???Young confirmed and expanded its ruling in 
Peruta. Taken together, these cases stand for the proposition that there is no Second 
Amendment protection whatsoever for the right to carry a concealed handgun172 but an 
individual right to carry a firearm openly lies at the core of the Amendment.173 While the 
Young court laid out Heller and McDonald?? support for its conclusion that a right to carry 
firearms for self-defense beyond the home does exist,174 Young?? nuanced, open-carry-
only interpretation of the core is unique. It is the only circuit opinion to reach beyond a 
ruling on the extent of the Second Amendment guarantee (that is, whether it exists in 
public) and to rule on the precise nature of the guarantee (that is, only a right to open-carry 
in public exists). From a practical standpoint, Young?? open-carry-only ruling seems an 
odd result. In fact, one would likely be among friends if this holding invokes images of 
leather-skinned, steely-eyed gunslingers squaring off with nervous hands hovering above 
their six-shooters. 
With Young ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an Uber driver in Honolulu and wishes to carry a firearm at work for self-protection. If he 
is only permitted to carry the firearm openly displayed on his hip, the effect on his income 
potential seems significant. Today, most of his customers would be put off at best, and 
terrified at worst, of the prospect of being escorted about town by a stranger visibly toting 
a pistol on his belt.175 ????????? ??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
lost income and carry openly, he may carry his weapon in a more socially acceptable?
but statutorily prohibited?manner (i.e., concealed),176 or he may ignore his safety 
concerns and work unarmed.177 However, a further issue remains. Assuming Mr. 
Hendricks chose to comply with the statute and wished to carry openly, in the wake of 
Young, what must he demonstrate, if anything, in order to obtain his open-carry permit? 
As will be discussed below, the answer is less than clear. 
ii. The Young Holding Failed to Rule Decisively on the Constitutionality of Good-
Cause Statutes 
At first glance, Young appears to reject the constitutionality of good-cause statutes, 
                                                          
172. Young, 896 F.3d at 1068; Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919, 939 (9th Cir. 2016). 
173. Young, 896 F.3d at 1070. Interestingly, this holding was essentially predicted in 2014. See generally 
Jonathan Meltzer, Open Carry for All: Heller and Our Nineteenth-Century Second Amendment, 123 YALE L.J. 
1486 (2014). 
174. See Young, 896 F.3d at 1070 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008); 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 787 (2010)) (stating ?we reject a cramped reading of the Second 
Amendment that renders to ?keep? and to ?bear? unequal guarantees. Heller and McDonald describe the core 
purpose of the Second Amendment as self-defense, and ?bear? effectuates such core purpose of self-defense in 
public.?). 
 175. Symposium, Heller and Public Carry Restrictions, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 431, 432 (2018) [hereinafter 
Symposium] (proposing that in today?s society openly displaying a firearm is considered provocative and very 
aggressive); See Meltzer, supra note 173, at 1526 (crediting Eugene Volokh with the proposition that due to 
social norms and the stigma against open carry, a right to open-carry would only deter law-abiding citizens from 
carrying at all). 
 176. Symposium, supra note 175, at 432. 
 177. Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-Defense: An Analytical 
Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1522 (2009). 
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at least to the extent that they infringe upon open-carry rights.178 Such a conclusion would 
place Young squarely on Wrenn?? side of the circuit divide.179 The simple fact that the 
Young court placed the right to open-??????????????????????????????????????????????????
the inference that the Ninth Circuit agreed with Wrenn.180 Young????????????????????????
??? ???????? ????????????? ??? ???? ?????? ?????????? ????????? ?????????? ???Wrenn, with each 
reference being either favorable or neutral.181 Certainly, none of Young?? abundant 
discussion of Wrenn ????????? ???? ?????? ??? ????????????? ????? ???? ????? ??????????
analysis.182
Perhaps most importantly, the Young court seemingly agreed with Wrenn?? logic 
that Second Amendment challenges must be decided by analyzing their effect on typically 
situated, law-abiding citizens.183 The Young court even went so far as to quote Wrenn??
?????????? ????????? ??????????????????????? ??? ???? ???-abiding citizens as a rule, then it 
must secure gun access a???????????????????????????????????????????????184 It is crucial to 
recall that in Wrenn, the D.C. Circuit rejected a good-cause statute because it prevented 
most law abiding citizens?those who lacked good-cause?from exercising their core 
Second Amendment right of public-carry.185
After announcing Wrenn?? law-abiding citizen standard as its guidepost, the Young 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????individuals to keep and 
bear arms, not groups of individuals. An individual right that does not apply to ordinary 
citizens would be a contradiction in terms; its existence would wax and wane with the 
??????????????????????????????186 Such language naturally leads to the inference that the 
Ninth Circuit believed that all law-abiding citizens?including those who lack good-
cause?have a constitutional right to carry firearms in public for self-defense. If the Young 
court did in fact intend to grant an individual open-carry right to all law-abiding citizens, 
the result could be a sweeping change to the status quo in Hawaii. However, the Ninth 
C?????????????????????????????-cause statutes was somewhat veiled in Young, and there is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The counterargument is that Young?? holding should not be interpreted as 
disfavoring legitimate good-cause statutes. Instead, it should be read only as a rejection of 
outright bans on open-carry. The distinction is critical. Remember that the split between 
                                                          
178. See Young, 896 F.3d at 1071 (?[I]f the Amendment is for law-abiding citizens as a rule, then it must 
secure gun access at least for each typical member of that class.?) (quoting Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 
F.3d 650, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2017)). 
 179. Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 665?66 (2017) (?[T]he point of the Amendment isn?t to 
ensure that some guns would find their way in to D.C., but that guns would be available to each responsible 
citizen as a rule . . . . So if Heller I dictates a certain treatment of ?total bans? on Second Amendment rights, that 
treatment must apply to total bans on carrying (or possession) by ordinarily situated individuals covered by the 
Amendment. This point brings into focus the legally decisive fact: the good-reason law is necessarily a total ban 
on most D.C. residents? right to carry a gun in the face of ordinary self-defense needs . . . . [I]t looks precisely 
for needs ?distinguishable? from those of the community.?). 
180. Young, 896 F.3d at 1070. 
181. See id. at 1052, 1058, 1062, 1064, 1069?71, 1074. 
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1071 (citing Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 665). 
184. Id.
 185. 864 F.3d at 664?66. 
186. Young, 896 F.3d at 1071. 
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the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits on one side and the D.C. Circuit on the other 
stems from a divergence of opinion over the constitutionality of good-cause statutes.187
However, circuits on both sides of the divide appear to believe that outright bans on public-
carry?that is, bans that deny the right even to those who demonstrate good-cause?are
more likely to be unconstitutional.188 Perhaps Young only stands for the proposition that 
complete open-carry bans are unconstitutional. Since the Young holding is somewhat 
opaque, the conclusion that the Ninth Circuit only intended to convey its disapproval of 
outright bans may also reasonably be inferred. Consider the following excerpt from Young:
Restricting open carry to those whose job entails protecting life or property necessarily 
restricts open carry to a small and insulated subset of law-abiding citizens. Just as the Second 
Amendment does not protect a right to bear arms only in connection with a militia, it surely 
does not protect a right to bear arms only as a security guard. The typical law-abiding citizen 
in the State of Hawaii is therefore entirely foreclosed from exercising the core Second 
Amendment right to bear arms for self-defense.189
If this passage merely means that all law-abiding citizens?not just those who are 
security guards?must be given the opportunity to establish good-cause before their open-
carry applications are accepted or rejected, then Young?? impact on Hawaiian gun laws 
and its contribution to the public-carry discussion are greatly minimized. The Ninth 
??????????????????????????? ???????????????? ?????????????-cause statute at all but was more 
akin to a de facto ban because, at least with regard to concealed carry, no license had ever 
been granted by the county, hints that Young?? holding may have been nothing more than 
a rejection of outright bans.190 In fact, the Ninth Circuit went so far as to note its belief 
that even the circuits that had previously upheld good-cause statutes would have struck 
????? ?? ???????????? ??? ??????????? ????????????191 The court?s discussion of legitimate 
good-cause statutes versus total bans on public-carry was surprisingly brief.192 Be that as 
it may, the discussion arguably leads to the reasonable assumption that if the Ninth Circuit 
???? ???????????????????? ????-carry restriction to be a legitimate good-cause statute it 
might have upheld it. 
If this is the correct interpretation of Young, then it is better-positioned against the 
D.C. Circuit and with the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Circuits. Under this view, Young 
would only add the unique wrinkle that while a state may enact a complete ban on 
concealed-carry, it must permit law-abiding citizens the opportunity to attempt to establish 
                                                          
 187. Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 676?77 (1st Cir. 2018); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 
81, 101 (2d Cir. 2012); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 434 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 
882 (4th Cir. 2013); Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 664?67 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
 188. This assertion is based on the fact that, in all of the following cases, the examining courts appear to make 
a point of distinguishing the laws they eventually declare valid under intermediate scrutiny from laws that operate 
as complete bans on public-carry. Presumably, this leads to the conclusion that these court consider complete 
public-carry bans to be more constitutionally problematic. See Gould, 907 F.3d at 674; Woollard, 712 F.3d at 
881 n.10; Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 91; Drake, 724 F.3d at 440. 
 189. 896 F.3d at 1071. 
190. See id. at 1071?72; see also Gould, 907 F.3d at 674 (noting that in Young, ?[t]he Ninth Circuit took pains 
to distinguish the Hawaii law from laws in which the ?good cause? standard ?did not disguise an effective ban on 
the public carry of firearms??). 
191. Young, 896 F.3d at 1072. 
192. Id. at 1071?72. 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
constitutionality of good-cause statutes that fall short of complete bans on open-carry? 
Although the weight of the Young opinion appears to concur with Wrenn?? ???? ????????
holding is ambiguous and leaves room for the argument that the Ninth Circuit would 
uphold a good-cause statute so long as it was less similar to an outright ban on open-carry 
than the one struck down in Young.
iii. The Young Court Over-Emphasized the Appropriate Role of Historical Analysis 
Regardless of whether Young?? holding is better understood as a rejection of the 
constitutionality of good-cause statutes or merely as a rejection of complete open-carry 
bans, it is out of step with modern sensibilities.193 While the ultimate pronouncement from 
Young, that some form of public-carry lies at the core of the Second Amendment, is 
arguably consistent with the spirit of Heller,194 the Young holding is deficient because it
places open-carry, and only open-???????????????????????????????????195 The logic that 
led to this conclusion appears to be an over-application of history to the ????????????????
Second Amendment analysis. 
True, Heller relied on history when declaring the existence of an individual right to 
handgun possession in the home.196 And it is further true that circuit courts since Heller
have largely utilized a historical approach to determine the scope of the right (that is, does 
it or does it not extend to public settings).197 However, by relying on antiquated case law 
expressing the preferences of open-carry versus concealed-carry that were contemporary 
to the antebellum south,198 Young likely reached beyond the utility of history to determine 
that only open-carry lies at the core of the Second Amendment. There comes a point when 
the application of history is too tenuous, especially if used to place rights in, or keep them 
out ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
open-carry versus concealed-carry are not the same today: in fact, they are arguably 
completely opposite.199
                                                          
 193. Nine years prior to Young v. Hawaii, Eugene Volokh observed that if a court employed history to conclude 
that the Second Amendment protected only a right to carry openly, it would arguably be mistaken given the 
change in public opinion regarding public vs. concealed carry. See Volokh, supra note 177, at 1521?24. 
194. See Young, 896 F.3d at 1070 (stating ?we reject a cramped reading of the Second Amendment that renders 
to ?keep? and to ?bear? unequal guarantees. Heller and McDonald describe the core purpose of the Second 
Amendment as self-defense, and ?bear? effectuates such core purpose of self-defense in public.?) (quoting District 
of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 599 (2008); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 787 (2010)); see 
also Volokh, supra note 177, at 1520 (stating ?[m]y inclination . . . is to defer . . . to a presumption that people 
should be free to have the tools they need for self-defense until there is solid evidence that possession of those 
tools will indeed cause serious harm. . . . Heller?s discussion of the phrase ?keep and bear? points in the same 
direction?). 
195. Young, 896 F.3d at 1069?70. 
196. See 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008). 
197. See, e.g., Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) (?History and tradition 
do not speak with one voice here. What history demonstrates is that states often disagreed as to the scope of the 
right to bear arms . . . ??); Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 658 (2017) (?Under Heller I?s treatment 
of these and earlier cases and commentaries, history matters . . . ??); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 
919, 929 (9th Cir. 2016). 
198. Young, 896 F.3d at 1054?57. 
199. See Volokh, supra note 177, at 1524 (arguing against the legitimacy of concealed carry bans by stating 
?[t]he historical exclusion [of a right to carry concealed] . . . was contingent on the social convention of the 
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A review of the precedent Young utilized to determine that open-carry is the only 
manner of public-carry within the core reveals fiery language regarding the concealed-
carry of handguns. For example, in 1850, while discussing a state statute that restricted the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? supreme court concluded: 
The [concealed carry] act[,] . . . [which] ?????? ??? ?? ???????????? ??? ??? ??????? ????? ??
concealed weapon, such as a dirk, dagger, knife, pistol, or any other deadly weapon 
concealed . . . [so] that [it] does not appear in full open view[,]? . . . became absolutely 
necessary to counteract a vicious state of society, growing out of the habit of carrying 
concealed weapons, and to prevent bloodshed and assassinations committed upon 
???????????????????????????????????? ??????? ?????????????????????????? . ???????????????????????
which places men upon an equality. This is the right guaranteed by the Constitution of the 
United States, and which is calculated to incite men to a manly and noble defence of 
themselves . . . without any tendency to secret advantages and unmanly assassinations.200
Moreover, in 1840, while interpreting the right to bear arms in State v. Reid, the 
Alabama Supreme Court referred to concealed-?????? ??? ????? ????? ????????? ??? ?????????
???????? ?????????201 and upheld a ban on concealed-carry, so long as some means of 
public-carry was permitted.202 Notably, the allowance of some form of public-carry was 
key to the court.203 It reasoned that a statute which prohibited public-carry entirely would 
be unconstitutional,204 and it explicitly noted that the legislature could not justifiably 
outlaw open-carry.205 After pronouncing the limits of legislative power regarding public-
carry restrictions, the Reid court affirmed the ??????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????? the safety of the people and the advancement of 
public morals??206 ??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????-carry 
as immoral. Further still, in Georgia, in 1846, the Nunn v. State court concluded that a 
concealed-carry ban was const???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of certain weapons in such a manner as is calculated to exert an unhappy influence upon 
the moral feelings of the wearer??207 In line with the high courts in Louisiana and 
Alabama, the Georgia Supreme Court held that, while concealed-carry could be banned, 
some form of public-carry must be permitted (leaving open-carry as the only logical 
alternative).208
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and courts upheld concealed-carry bans because concealed-carry was considered a 
devious, cowardly practice.209 On the other hand, the right to carry firearms openly, which 
                                                          
time?the social legitimacy of open carry, and the sense that concealed carry was the behavior of criminals?
and this exclusion is no longer sustainable now that conventions are different?); Symposium, supra note 175, at 
432 (proposing that in today?s society openly displaying a firearm is considered provocative and very aggressive). 
 200. State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 489?90 (1850) (emphasis added). 
 201. 1 Ala. 612, 614, 616 (Ala. 1840). 
202. Id. at 616?17, 619. 
203. Id.
204. Id. at 616?17. 
205. Id. at 619. 
206. Reid, 1 Ala. at 616 (emphasis added). 
 207. 1 Ga. 243, 249 (Ga. 1846) (emphasis added). 
208. Id. at 249, 251. 
209. See Robert M. Ireland, The Problem of Concealed Weapons in Nineteenth-Century Kentucky, 91 REG.
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was viewed as noble and upright,210 was permitted and could not constitutionally be 
denied.211 The question that naturally follows is?what influence should these opinions 
have had on the Ninth Circuit in 2018 as it endeavored to determine whether a specific 
method of public-carry is permitted by the Constitution? While the Young court seemingly 
assigned them great weight,212 their role in the 2018 decision should have been minimal 
???????? ???? ?????????? ???? ???????????? ???????? ??????? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ??????????
carry] was contingent on the social conventions of the time . . . and this exclusion is no 
long???????????????????????????????????????????????????????213 Unlike the social norms in 
the nineteenth-century South, modern opinion largely views the practice of open-carry as 
aggressive and provocative.214 Arguably, most of present-day society would prefer that if 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????215
In sum, although Heller makes clear that historical analysis is an important 
consideration in resolving Second Amendment issues,216 Young likely over-stepped the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????217 Since the antebellum opinions Young relied on were exclusively 
based on public-carry attitudes of a specific time and region, and further, since those 
attitudes arguably no longer persist, Young used history to apply antiquated and irrelevant 
social opinions to modern-day conduct. 
Admittedly, a counter-argument can be made that Young?? placement of open-carry 
at the core was dictated by Heller.218 Obviously, Heller prevented the Young court from 
working with a blank canvas,219 and there is language in Heller suggesting that concealed-
carry bans may be lawful under the Second Amendment.220 While pronouncing that 
Second Amendment rights are not unlim????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
                                                          
KY. HIST. SOC?Y 370, 370?72 (1993) (asserting that those opposed to outlawing the practice of dueling to settle 
disputes in Kentucky were giving license to cowards to arm themselves with concealed weapons); Volokh, supra 
note 177, at 1521?23. 
 210. Volokh, supra note 177, at 1523 (?Carrying arms, the theory went, was ?one of the most essential 
privileges of freemen,? but ?open, manly, and chivalrous? people wore their guns openly . . . ??). 
211. Reid, 1 Ala. at 619; State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850); Nunn, 1 Ga. at 249. 
 212. 896 F.3d 1044, 1056?57 (9th Cir. 2018) (?[E]ven though our court has read these cases to exclude 
concealed carry from the Second Amendment?s protections, . . . the same cases command that the Second 
Amendment must encompass a right to open carry.?). 
 213. This is Eugene Volokh?s quote made while advancing an argument that seems to support this proposition. 
See Volokh, supra note 177, at 1524. 
 214. Symposium, supra note 175, at 432. 
215. Id.
216. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008); see also Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 
864 F.3d 650, 658 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (?Under Heller I’s treatment of these and earlier cases and commentaries, 
history matters . . . ??). 
 217. Volokh, supra note 177, at 1522. 
218. Cf. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment and the Inalienable Right to Self-Defense, HERITAGE (Apr. 17, 
2014) (stating that Heller’s non-exclusive list of presumptively lawful regulations included a ban on concealed 
carry, thus arguably implying that the only public-carry option left available by Heller was open-carry), 
http://www.heritage.org/the-constitution/report/the-second-amendment-and-the-inalienable-right-self-defense. 
 219. Telephone Interview with Nelson Lund, Professor, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, 
(Nov. 30, 2018). 
220. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; Lund, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that Heller appeared to approve of 
concealed carry restrictions). 
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?????? ???? ??????? ??????????? ??? ???? ??????? ????????????221 the specific illustration 
Heller used to demonstrate its point is telling. The Supreme Court ???????????????????????
the majority of 19th-century courts . . . held that prohibitions on carrying concealed 
???????? ????? ??????? ?????? ???? ??????? ?????????? ??? ?????? ???????????222 If this 
language means that Heller favored (or at least did not overtly disfavor) concealed-carry 
bans,223 and further, if it was Young?? aim to ensure the protection of some form of public-
carry, then the previous argument of this Note fails. Under such circumstances, the Ninth 
????????? only option was to place open-carry at the core because Hawaii had every right, 
under Heller, to ban concealed-carry.224
On the other hand, maybe Heller did not intend to convey approval of concealed-
carry bans.225 Perhaps, the Supreme Court was simply using historical bans on concealed-
carry to illustrate a larger point that Second Amendment rights are not unlimited.226
Consider carefully Heller?? direct discussion of historical concealed-carry restrictions: 
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited. From 
Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained 
that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner 
whatsoever and for whatever purpose. For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts 
to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful 
under the Second Amendment or state analogues. (citations omitted). Although we do not 
undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the Second 
Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding 
prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding 
the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or 
laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.227
???????????? ???????????? ??????????????????????? ??????????????228 First, the Court 
                                                          
221. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626. 
222. Id.
223. See Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197, 1201 (10th Cir. 2013) (supporting the view that Heller?s
language excluded concealed carry rights from Second Amendment protection); Heller v. District of Columbia, 
670 F.3d 1244, 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (supporting the view that concealed-carry 
regulations are permissible under Heller); Jonathan Lowy & Kelly Sampson, Right Not to Be Shot: Public Safety, 
Private Guns, and the Constellation of Constitutional Liberties, 14 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL?Y 187, 189 (2016); 
Meltzer, supra note 173, at 1486; Lund, supra note 218. 
224. See Lowy & Sampson, supra note 223, at 189; Lund, supra note 218. 
225. See Megan Ruebsamen, The Gun-Shy Commonwealth: Self-Defense and Concealed Carry in Post-Heller
Massachusetts, 18 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 55, 76 (2013) (referencing Heller and stating ?[t]he 
Supreme Court did not examine the constitutionality of statutes restricting the right of law-abiding citizens to 
carry concealed weapons for use in self-defense, but their lack of examination does not mean laws restricting 
conceal and carry are presumptively valid?); Jeff Golimowski, Pulling the Trigger: Evaluating Criminal Gun 
Laws in a Post-Heller World, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1599, 1608 n.85 (2012) (noting that although concealed-
carry restrictions were discussed in Heller, they were not included in ?Heller’s laundry list? of presumptively 
lawful prohibitions); Lund supra note 20, at 10 (noting that although Heller appeared to approve of concealed 
carry restrictions, the Court stopped short of expressly doing so) (emphasis added). 
226. See Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85. 
 227. 554 U.S. 570, 626?27 (2008) (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). 
 228. The argument advanced in this Note regarding the possible significance of the Court?s sequence of 
discussion regarding concealed-carry was developed after noting Jeff Golimowski?s observation in n.85. See 
Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85. 
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acknowledged the existence of nineteenth-century concealed-carry restrictions.229 The 
Court then seemed to pause and interject its unwillingness to undertake a full analysis of 
the scope of the Second Amendment.230 And then, only after declining to conduct a full 
scope analysis, the Court expressly listed several types of Second Amendment regulations 
its holding was not intended to disturb.231 Strikingly absent from this list was any 
suggestion that Heller favored concealed-carry prohibitions.232 Although Heller’s list of 
lawful prohibitions was not exhaustive,233 it is reasonable to conclude that if the Supreme 
Court had intended to support concealed-carry restrictions, it would have made that intent 
apparent by including concealed-carry bans on its list of acceptable Second Amendment 
limitations. 
????????? ???? ???????? ?????????????? ??? ???????? ?? ????? ??????? ?????????? ??????
analysis was intended to be a signal that if the Court had chosen to conduct a scope 
analysis, it would have determined that concealed-?????? ?????????? ???? ???????????????
????????234 If this proposal is sound, then Young’s placement of open-carry within the core 
was unnecessary. A better alternative would have been for the Ninth Circuit simply to 
follow Wrenn and place public-carry at the core, then allow Hawaii to decide which 
manner(s) of public-carry it preferred to make available to its citizens.235
V. WHAT IS A CORE IN THE FIRST PLACE? A MORE CONCRETE DEFINITION
MAY HAVE CAUSED A DIFFERENT OUTCOME IN YOUNG
Perhaps, in order to determine whether an individual public-carry right is properly 
placed at the core of the Second Amendment, it is necessary to first address a more 
fundamental question: what exactly does it mean for the Second Amendment to have a 
core? Importantly, this question does not ask what the core of the Amendment is; rather, 
it asks what a core is in the first place. One must accept here, as a practical matter, that a 
right cannot be accurately positioned in relation to the core unless there is a concrete 
understanding of what a core is. A review of circuit-level public-carry case law reveals no 
firm definition of a core within the context of the Second Amendment.236
Notably, the judicial focus on the core appears to be growing alongside the temporal 
distance from Heller. In Heller????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                          
229. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see also Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85. 
230. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626; see also Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85. 
231. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626?27; see also Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85. 
 232. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626?27; see also Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85. 
233. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626?27 n.26. 
234. Id.
 235. This is known as the alternative outlet theory which has been discussed in case law and scholarly writing. 
The theory stands for the proposition that one method of carry may be banned or restricted so long as the other 
method is permitted. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 662 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (?The rights to keep 
and to bear, to possess and to carry, are equally important inasmuch as regulations on each must leave alternative 
channels for both.?); see also Meltzer, supra note 173, at 1525?28; James Bishop, Hidden or on the Hip: The 
Right(s) to Carry After Heller, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 907, 917?21 (2012). 
236. See generally Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933 (7th Cir. 2012); Kachalsky v. County of 
Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. 
Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Peruta v. County of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Wrenn,
864 F.3d 650; Young v. Hawaii, 896 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2018); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018). 
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of the opinion.237 On the other hand, in the recent cases of Wrenn, Young, and Gould?all
of which use Heller as their primary guide??????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????-
seven times, twenty-five times, and nineteen times respectively.238
A. A Proposed Definition of the Core 
Relying on language and inferences from Heller?? ?? ??????? ?????????? ??????? ????
?????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
matter appear to support this proposition. While Heller used the word core only three 
times, the majority alone used the word purpose thirty-five times.239 Moreover, when the 
Supreme Court did use the word core, it was commonly in conjunction with the word 
purpose. For example, in McDonald, the Court n??????????????????????????????????????????
use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense.??240 The same interplay was 
also present in Heller?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
home must be kept inoperable, the Heller ????????????????????????????????????????????????
it impossible for citizens to use [handguns] for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and 
??????????????????????????????241 If this proposed substitution of terms were accepted, it 
would cause an examining court to substitute the phrase primary purpose every time it 
intended to use the word core. 
Substituting the phrase primary purpose for the word core and applying it to Heller 
renders the reasonable conclusion that the primary purpose of the Second Amendment is 
to guarantee an individual right of self-defense.242 Prior to Young, the split among the 
circuits was limited to a lack of agreement over the extent of the primary purpose. 
Specifically, was the primary purpose of the Amendment to guarantee a right of self-
defense wherever such need arose, or was it only to guarantee a self-defense right within 
the home? This is a legitimate question which Heller left unanswered?hence the split. 
B. The Potential Impact of this Proposed Definition of the Core on Young 
Young essentially concluded that the primary purpose of the Second Amendment is 
to secure an individual right to self-defense wherever such need arises, but only by way of 
open-carry.243 But if core actually means primary purpose, Young’s conclusion does not 
                                                          
 237. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630, 634, 720. 
238. Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 657?59, 661, 664?67; Young, 896 F.3d at 1052, 1068?71; Gould, 907 F.3d at 667, 
670?72, 674. 
 239. Heller, 554 U.S. at 577?78, 584, 588?90, 595, 599?600, 602, 608, 612?13, 617?18, 620, 625?26, 628?
31, 635. 
 240. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 768 (2010) (emphasis added). 
 241. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added); see also Zuidema, supra note 15, at 826 (?Heller identified the 
core of the Second Amendment as the right to keep firearms for the ?lawful purpose of self-defense,? while the 
periphery consists of the right to keep and bear arms for lawful purposes other than self-defense, such as hunting 
or recreation.?). 
242. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 592 (?[W]e find [the textual elements of the Second Amendment] guarantee the 
individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation. . . . The very text of the Second 
Amendment implicitly recognizes the pre-existence of the right and declares only that it ?shall not be 
infringed.??). 
243. Cf. Young, 896 F.3d at 1070. 
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add up because a person can defend herself regardless of whether she carries her firearm 
openly or concealed. Stated plainly, the manner of carry (concealed versus open) has no 
relationship to the primary purpose of self-defense. Since the Second Amendmen????
primary purpose can be carried out by either manner of carry, it was inappropriate for the 
Ninth Circuit to elevate one manner to the core and exclude the other. 
The reason for excluding such matters from the core guarantee is apparent given the 
previously discussed notion that statutes which infringe on the core will be subjected to a 
heightened level of scrutiny.244 By placing open-carry within the core of the Second 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-carry 
in favor of concealed-carry. This is a faulty result. Although some lower courts have 
observed Heller and McDonald’s apparent support for the idea that the right to self-defense 
exists wherever the need arises,245 individual states should have latitude to choose whether 
they want to allow both methods of public-carry or prefer to restrict or even ban one in 
favor of the other.246
VI. GIVEN THE DISAGREEMENT OVER THE SECOND??????????? CORE
AND????????? STATUS AS A MASS-SHOOTING SOCIETY, SUPREME
COURT INTERVENTION IS NECESSARY 
??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Court resolution of the circuit dispute is both necessary and appropriate. While it is 
dangerous to speculate whether the highest Court would place a right to public-carry 
within the core, it is undeniable that the public safety implications of its decision could be 
profound. 2019 America is arguably a mass-shooting society.247 Within a recent twelve-
                                                          
244. E.g., Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 876 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 
458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011)) (?[W]e assume that any law that would burden the ?fundamental,? core right of self-
defense in the home by a law-abiding citizen would be subject to strict scrutiny. But, as we move outside the 
home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests often outweigh individual 
interests in self-defense.?); Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659, 670?71 (1st Cir. 2018) (?In our judgment, the 
appropriate level of scrutiny must turn on how closely a particular law or policy approaches the core of the 
Second Amendment right and how heavily it burdens that right. A law or policy that burdens conduct falling 
within the core of the Second Amendment requires a correspondingly strict level of scrutiny, whereas a law or 
policy that burdens conduct falling outside the core of the Second Amendment logically requires a less 
demanding level of scrutiny.?); Kachalsky v. County of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 93 (2d Cir. 2012) (?We do 
not believe however, that heightened scrutiny must always be akin to strict scrutiny when a law burdens the 
Second Amendment. . . . Although we have no occasion to decide what level of scrutiny should apply to laws 
that burden the ?core? Second Amendment protection identified in Heller, we believe that applying less than strict 
scrutiny when the regulation does not burden the ?core? protection of self-defense in the home makes eminent 
sense . . . ??); see also Zuidema, supra note 15, at 826 (?Most courts have determined that the core is afforded 
more protection than rights falling within the amendment?s periphery.?). 
245. See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 657?58 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Young, 896 F.3d at 1070 
(citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 599; McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 787 (2010)). 
 246. The conclusion that ?core? is properly defined as ?primary purpose? supports the alternative outlet theory 
mentioned in note 235. The theory has been discussed in case law and scholarly writings. The theory stands for 
the proposition that one method of carry may be banned or restricted so long as the other is allowed. See Wrenn,
864 F.3d 650 at 662?63 (?The rights to keep and to bear, to possess and to carry, are equally important inasmuch 
as regulations on each must leave alternative channels for both.?); see also Meltzer, supra note 173, at 1525?28; 
Bishop, supra note 235, at 917?21. 
247. See Susan Miller & Kevin McCoy, Thousand Oaks makes 307 mass shootings in 311 days, USA TODAY 
(Nov. 8, 2018, 10:29 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/11/08/thousand-oaks-california-
bar-shooting-307th-mass-shooting/1928574002/ (stating that in the 311 days of 2018 up to the writing of the 
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day span, twenty-three people were killed and nine more injured in two high-profile mass 
shootings at a synagogue in Pittsburgh and a crowded bar in Thousand Oaks, California.248
As senselessly tragic as the murders of twenty-three people are, it is equally appalling that 
this nation has reached the point where certain mass shootings are high-profile?
necessarily implying that other mass shootings are not.249
?????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
Custodio was firing a gun into a group of pedestrians on the opposite side of the street.250
Under such circumstances, is it not reasonable to conclude that Hendricks prevented a 
mass shooting? If it is reasonable, now take Hendricks and place him leaning against the 
corner of a pool table at the Borderline Bar and Grill in Thousand Oaks, California, or 
worshiping at the Tree of Life Synagogue in Pittsburgh. Assuming he perceived the same 
threat and took the same action he did in Chicago, those recent tragedies are possibly 
prevented or, at least, rendered less catastrophic.251
It is necessary to recognize that individuals calling for greater control and those 
seeking expanded gun rights, while taking diametrically opposed positions, presumably 
share the same end goal?increased public safety. Arguably, a shortcoming of the gun 
control argument is a failure to recognize the reality of Heller?? effect. While the belief 
that Heller was wrongly decided is fair, it is also irrelevant. Heller, at a minimum, 
guarantees the right to possess and use handguns for self-defense in the home.252 As a 
result, handguns are plentiful in America, and Heller takes no issue with that.253 Given 
this, it is questionable whether restrictions on the right to carry handguns in public for self-
defense would have a positive impact on public safety,254 especially within the sphere of 
mass shootings. It seems a somewhat tenuous argument to claim that criminalizing public-
carry by law-abiding citizens will dissuade a mass-shooter from carrying out his 
                                                          
article, 307 mass shootings had occurred). 
 248. Shelly Bradbury, Tree of Life Survivor Released from Hospital After Mass Shooting, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Nov. 7, 2018, 9:49 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/city/2018/11/07/Tree-of-Life-survivor-
released-from-hospital-Andrea-Wedner/stories/201811070114 (providing updated information on the mass 
shooting that occurred on October 27, 2018); Katie Zezima, Mark Berman, Lindsey Bever & Isaac Stanley-
Becker, 12 People Killed, Including Sheriff’s Deputy in ‘Horrific’ California Bar Shooting, WASH. POST (Nov. 
8, 2018, 6:03 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2018/11/08/multiple-injuries-reported-bar-
shooting-thousand-oaks-calif/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.5fb1dd7424f2; Mass Shootings in 2018, GUN
VIOLENCE ARCHIVE (last visited Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/reports/mass-shooting. 
249. Cf. Miller & McCoy, supra note 247 (stating that in the 311 days of 2018 up to the writing of the article, 
307 mass shootings had occurred). 
 250. See, e.g., Bates, supra note 1; Ziezulewicz, supra note 1. 
251. Cf. Bates, supra note 1; Fedschun, supra note 11; McCausland, supra note 11. But see Violence Policy 
Center: Concealed Carry Killers, CONCEALED CARRY KILLERS, http://concealedcarrykillers.org/ (last updated 
Jan. 17, 2019). 
 252. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628?30 (2008). 
253. Id. at 636 (?We are aware of the problem of handgun violence in this country, and we take seriously the 
concerns raised by the many amici who believe the prohibition of handgun ownership is a solution. . . . But the 
enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table. These include the 
absolute prohibition of handguns held and used for self-defense in the home.?); Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 
933, 939 (7th Cir. 2012) (?Anyway the Supreme Court made clear in Heller that it wasn?t going to make a right 
to bear arms depend on casualty counts. If the mere possibility that allowing guns to be carried in public would 
increase crime or death rates sufficed to justify a ban, Heller would have been decided the other way . . . ??). 
254. See Lott, supra note 8, at 1212?13 (2012). But see WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 6?7.
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carnage.255 An extension of Heller ????????????????????????????????????????????? core 
guarantee, the right to carry handguns beyond the home for self-defense might reduce the 
mass-shooting casualty count. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Despite the well-????????????????? ????? ????????????????????? ????????? ???????????
Amendment to apply only to the preservation and maintenance of state militias, Heller 
confidently pronounced that the Amendment secures an individual right to self-defense 
that is preserved even in the absence of any militia connection. But, how far does this right 
extend? Is it limited to the home or does it also exist in public? As evidenced by the current 
circuit split, Helle??s holding has spawned confusion and disagreement over the scope of 
?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
Amendment must have some application in public, the tension among the circuits appears 
to be narrowly focused on whether public-carry does or does not lie within the 
?????????????????? ????????Heller provides fodder for both views, the more compelling 
argument, advanced in Wrenn and arguably?although not decisively?in Young, is that 
public-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-cause statutes 
that restrict the public-carry rights of law-abiding citizens should be deemed 
unconstitutional. 
Despite Young?? apparent concurrence with Wrenn on the determination that public-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
carry is the only form of public-carry within the core, disconnects it from modern 
sensibilities.256 While an argument can be made that placing open-carry at the core was 
the only option Heller left available to the Young court if its aim was to place some form 
of public-carry within the core,257 there is a counter-argument that Heller did not intend 
to endorse concealed-carry restrictions.258
If the core of the Second Amendment is accurately defined as the primary purpose 
of the Amendment, then it was inappropriate for the Ninth Circuit to place a specific 
manner of public-carry within the core because th??????????????????????????????self-
defense?can be exercised regardless of whether a handgun is carried openly or concealed. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
intervention is necessary to decisively determine the level of constitutional protection 
public-carry should be afforded. A ruling in either direction could have significant public 
                                                          
255. See Lott Jr., supra note 8, at 1212?13. But see WEBSTER, supra note 8, at 6?7. 
256. See Ireland, supra note 209, at 370?72; Volokh, supra note 177, at 1523?24; Symposium, supra note 
175, at 432 (proposing that in today?s society openly displaying a firearm is considered provocative and very 
aggressive). 
257. Cf. Lund, supra note 218 (?Heller . . . set[s] forth a non-exclusive list of ?presumptively lawful?
regulations that include . . . bans on the concealed carry of firearms . . . ??). 
258. See Ruebsamen, supra note 225, at 76?77 (referencing Heller and stating, ?[t]he Supreme Court did not 
examine the constitutionality of statutes restricting the right of law-abiding citizens to carry concealed weapons 
for use in self-defense, but their lack of examination does not mean laws restricting conceal and carry are 
presumptively valid?); Golimowski, supra note 225, at 1608 n.85 (noting that although concealed-carry 
restrictions were discussed in Heller, they were not included in ?Heller?s laundry list? of presumptively lawful 
prohibitions); Lund, supra note 20, at 10 (noting that although Heller appeared to approve of concealed carry 
restrictions, the Court stopped short of expressly doing so). 
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-Ryan Curry*
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